



Department of Home Affairs Annual Report of the Surveillance Commissioner for 2018

**Annual Report
of
the Surveillance Commissioner
for 2018**

- to comply with Section 28(3) of the Regulation of Surveillance Act 2006 -

This report covers the 12th full year of the operation of the Regulation of Surveillance Act Etc. 2006 ("the ROSE Act"). This report, together with my earlier reports, is available on the Department of Home Affairs website.

Steven Coren, Deputy Commissioner, provides cover for the absences of the Commissioner and also allows an alternative person for scrutiny and authorisation if a conflict of interest arises for the Commissioner in any particular case. The Deputy Commissioner and I continue to have occasional meetings to discuss issues, to ensure that common standards are applied and practice is improved. The Deputy Commissioner contributes to the compilation of the Annual Report.

I did not authorise any intrusive surveillance episodes during the year.

My Deputy and I scrutinised 31 authorisations for directed surveillance. On a number of occasions I discussed individual directed surveillance authorisations with the authority concerned, usually to request further information. Additional information requested was always provided. The co-operation from the authorities authorising directed surveillance was satisfactory. I did not deploy my power to quash any authorisations.

The number of authorisations in 2018 was 31 a decrease of 23 from the 54 authorised during the previous year. Since the ROSE Act came into operation at the end of 2006, there have been variations in the number of authorisations. After the first full year when there were 96 authorisations, there were four years of reductions; followed by several years of increases. Variations from year to year are quite normal. However it is appropriate to note that this year's total is considerably lower than any previous year since the ROSE Act came into effect at the end of 2006. It is likely that the decrease in part reflects the continuing pressure on public service budgets. Mounting surveillance operations can be costly particularly in respect of staffing.

In 2018, like the previous year, no authorising authority has reported that there had been a failure to follow procedures in respect of an authorisation.

Not all the authorisations result in surveillance being applied. Changed circumstances – for example if the subject of the authorised surveillance was taken into custody or left the Island before surveillance commenced – means that the number of surveillance operations actually implemented can be less than the total number authorised. However, the reduced number of authorisations since 2007 also contributed to a higher proportion of authorisations being implemented in recent years than in the early years of the ROSE Act.

Authorised surveillance continues to play a valuable part in enabling public authorities properly to investigate matters authorised under the ROSE Act. A significant proportion of the authorised surveillance operations resulted in further action by the public authority concerned. In the case of surveillance undertaken by the Isle of Man Constabulary, this is sometimes reported as part of the court proceedings in the Island's media. Similarly, cases brought to court by the Treasury involving alleged benefit fraud in which authorised surveillance had played a part, are reported from time to time in the Island's media.

The public authorities given the powers by Tynwald to authorise surveillance have varied since 2006 as changes were made to the configuration of Government Departments. Seven public authorities were eligible to authorise surveillance from October 2017. Three public authorities used their powers in 2018. Some of the larger or more complex Departments have a number of different subdivisions reflecting different responsibilities and some subdivisions have been granted the power to authorise surveillance under the ROSE Act. Thus the number of public authorities eligible to authorise surveillance does not coincide with the number of Government Departments. The latest list is approved by Tynwald and published as "Regulation of Surveillance (Prescription of Offices, Ranks and Positions) Order 2017".

In previous years I have reported that I have obtained and studied the annual Report of the Chief Surveillance Commissioner (CSC) in the UK. However the 2017 report was the last one produced by the CSC. From September 2017 the Investigatory Powers Commissioner's Office assumed responsibility for this task. This is the result of the implementation of the 2016 Investigatory Powers Act 2016.

In the early part of 2018, I had a further informal meeting with the Interception of Communications Commissioner (ICC), Susie Alegre, to discuss issues where our respective responsibilities adjoin. The 2014 Report of the ICC (GD 2015/0017) includes suggestions where the law may require reform. In particular she suggested that warrants under the Theft Act more properly relate to surveillance activities than to interception. Such warrants might therefore more sensibly come under the purview of the Surveillance Commissioner. I continue to endorse this suggestion.

In this year's report I am again including an indication of the value of surveillance to public authorities. In addition to the possible deterrent impact on potential offenders, the Treasury have identified that some £171,900 of overpayments and benefit savings have resulted from cases in which authorised surveillance played a significant part. This total is similar to that identified in the previous year. The effects of any one year's' authorisations may in some cases not work through fully into savings until the following year, a factor to take account of when comparing the savings of one year with another. The total savings have varied considerably over the years that I have included such figures in my annual reports. It is significant that this saving was achieved despite the considerable reduction in the total number of authorisations.

After more than a decade's experience of the operation of the ROSE Act, it is clear that many of the authorities empowered to use surveillance have made no use of the powers; others have used the powers very infrequently. I have previously explained that for public authorities who make only very occasional use of the power to authorise surveillance, one challenge is to ensure that authorising staff are fully familiar with procedures. Authorising Officers should be especially careful to consider fully the test of proportionality before authorising directed surveillance.

A further challenge for public authorities who use surveillance infrequently is to ensure that those authorised to carry out surveillance are trained to perform to a satisfactory standard. These challenges are factors which should be taken into account whenever consideration is given to extending the powers to authorise surveillance to other public authorities. The experience of the last decade indicates that rather than extending powers to other public authorities, there may be no present need for all the public authorities currently able to authorise surveillance to possess these powers.

If a public authority that has not used surveillance previously, or has only used surveillance on a very few occasions, approaches me for advice, I meet with the authority and provide guidance about best practice.

In my previous reports, I have commented on the need to review and update the legislation authorising surveillance on the Island, especially in view of changes made elsewhere. Those interested in the details of this important issue are referred to my previous reports. I am aware that the Department of Home Affairs intend to conduct such a review. I await developments.

I can confirm that under section 28(4) of the Regulation of Surveillance Act 2006 no matter has been excluded from my report at the request of the Department of Home Affairs under section 28(5).

Brendan O’Friel
Surveillance Commissioner

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